CVE-2026-70557

Summary

diboot-core's POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowl

Details

diboot-core's POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro's two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor's recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.

References

• https://github.com/dibo-software/diboot
• https://github.com/dibo-software/diboot/issues/104
• https://github.com/dibo-software/diboot/issues/104