CVE-2026-41417
Published: Wed, 06 May 2026 22:16
Summary
Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF a
Details
Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
Are YOU affected by CVE-2026-41417?
5-second check on your actual server. Reads /etc/os-release, uname -r, and dpkg-query; matches against the live USN + Debian Security Tracker feeds; tells you whether CVE-2026-41417 (and any other live CVE) applies. Anonymous, no signup.
curl https://mindsparkstack.com/scan.sh | bash
References
StackPatch runs this match against YOUR installed packages every hour
Free 1-server / $99 lifetime founder seat (50 only) / $19+/mo monthly. Indie pricing.